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JUSTIFIABLE DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF OPPOSITE-SEX CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS 
 
OPPOSITE-SEX couples are prohibited from forming a civil partnership. Following the 
introduction of same-sex marriage, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was not extended to 
opposite-sex couples, resulting in the unusual position that English law permits same-sex 
couples access to two relationship forms (marriage and civil partnership) yet limits opposite-
sex couples to one (marriage). This discrimination was recently challenged in the courts by 
an opposite-sex couple, Rebecca Steinfeld and Charles Keidan, who wish to enter a civil 
partnership owing to their deeply-rooted ideological opposition to marriage. Rejecting 
marriage as a patriarchal institution and believing that a civil partnership would offer a more 
egalitarian public expression of their relationship, the couple argued that the current ban 
constitutes a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  
 The recent Court of Appeal decision in Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for 
Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81 provides the latest statement on this issue following the 
couple’s earlier and unsuccessful challenge in the High Court. At first instance, the couple’s 
challenge was found not to fall within the ambit of Article 8, on the basis that they were able 
to marry and it was merely the couple’s consciences that prevented them from accessing an 
equivalent legal recognition of their status. Drawing upon dicta from the House of Lords in M 
v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] UKHL 11, [2006] 2 A.C. 91 Andrews J. 
erroneously analysed the ambit question by assessing the magnitude of detriment to the 
couple concerned, such as whether they were subjected to humiliation or detrimental 
treatment, rather than asking whether the ban was linked to the exercise of the right 
guaranteed (see Petrovic v Austria (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 14 and for criticism of M see J. 
Scherpe, “Family and Private Life, Ambits and Pieces” [2007] C.F.L.Q. 390). Even had the 
measure been found to fall within the ambit, Andrews J. believed that the Secretary of State 
was justified in maintaining the ban under Article 14. Gathering data on the uptake of civil 
partnerships for same-sex couples following marriage equality served the legitimate aim of 
avoiding unnecessary disruption and waste of public expenditure.  
 The Court of Appeal dismissed the couple’s  appeal by a 2:1 majority. Arden L.J. 
produced the main and most detailed opinion, which was broken down into two issues: ambit 
and justification. In relation to ambit, the Court of Appeal unanimously reversed Andrews J. 
As recently affirmed in Oliari and others v Italy [2015] E.C.H.R. 716, Article 8(1) 
encompasses a positive obligation to respect family life for both same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples and thus the “modality” used to formally express those relationships falls within that 
specific obligation (at [33]-[34]). Contrary to the argument put forward by the Government in 
Steinfeld, the fact that the couple could marry did not mean, the Court of Appeal found, that 
they no longer possessed a personal interest close to the core of Article 8. The availability of 
a modality that in light of the couple’s sincerely held views was “simply not an option” did 
not mean that any discrimination had ceased (at [169] per Briggs L.J.). After all, same-sex 
couples with reservations as to marriage currently possess a choice as to relationship form 
which is denied to opposite-sex couples (at [168] per Briggs L.J.). Moreover, the couple 
“cannot be forced to marry” and thus the availability of marriage was only found to have 
relevance at the justification stage (at [40]).   
 The Court of Appeal also had to navigate domestic authorities such as M and 
Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2007] 1 F.L.R. 295 which suggested a 
measure would be outside the ambit of Article 8 unless it infringed some rights or interests of 
the appellants that were close to the core values of the rights in question and, in addition, that 
such infringement had an adverse impact. Recognising that the core values of family life do 
not have a static meaning, Arden L.J. acknowledged that the legal recognition of a 
relationship was “of moment” and was linked to an “individual’s existence and identity” (at 
[62] referring to Oliari at [177]). As for the need to show adverse impact, a distinction was 
drawn between negative obligations imposed on a State requiring such impact to be 
evidenced and positive obligations, where, it was found, the “only test” was whether the 
appellants’ claim was “too tenuous” to the positive obligation to promote family life (at [68]).  
 However, in relation to justification, the Court of Appeal was divided as to whether 
the ban served a legitimate aim and was proportionate. All members accepted that awaiting 
statistical data on the uptake of civil partnerships following same-sex marriage constituted a 
legitimate aim by averting a potentially disruptive and expensive exercise of extending civil 
partnerships only to find that there was no demand for them. As to proportionality, Beatson 
L.J. and Briggs L.J. believed that the Government’s position was justifiable now but not 
indefinitely. Their concern was that, despite the slow progress of the Government, the court 
must not “micro-manage areas of social and economic policy” (at [162]). Nevertheless, 
without giving the Government a deadline for change, Beatson L.J. stated that over time it 
would become “increasingly difficult” to justify a “wait and see” position in the future (at 
[162]). Arden LJ dissented on this point, considering that the delay was presently 
unjustifiable especially as the “discrimination in this case affects one the closest relationships 
which one adult has with another” (at [110]). 
 Steinfeld raises three key issues. First, while Arden LJ applauded the “thoughtful and 
comprehensive” judgment of Andrews J., the court has, in part, clarified the meaning of 
ambit, which was a particularly troubling aspect of the first instance decision (at [10]). The 
court was correct to conceptualise the formal expression of a relationship as something 
capable of falling within the ambit, using the “link test”, but the sub-division of ambit 
depending on whether it concerned a positive or negative obligation is problematic. Although 
Arden L.J. clearly did this to distinguish countervailing domestic authority, this distinction is 
not present at the Strasbourg level, and it is interesting to note that neither Beatson L.J. nor 
Briggs L.J. supported such a test. Given that the appellants wish to appeal to the Supreme 
Court, this aspect of the decision may be subject to heightened scrutiny, but it is likely that 
the situation would nevertheless be found to fall within the ambit on the basis that civil 
partnerships reflect a modality close to the core of Article 8. 
 Secondly, there is now a discernible shift in the Government’s position over the 
optimal way forward. Of the menu of possible options for reform, ranging from abolition, 
phasing out (i.e. abolish same-sex civil partnerships but retain existing ones), or extension to 
opposite-sex couples, Beatson L.J. acknowledged that an earlier option of “maintaining the 
status quo is not being considered by the government” (at [153]). This change of position is 
significant and underlines the need for empirical data that can inform the future direction of 
travel. On this point Arden L.J. is correct to highlight that, whilst there has been a decline in 
civil partnerships following same-sex marriage, the “information is not all one-way” (at 
[121]). Here, she notes a substantial rise in civil partnership formations between both men 
and women over the age of 50. This broad critical focus is welcome, but it does overlook the 
fundamental nature of the appellants’ claim: no amount of data on same-sex civil partnership 
registrations, conversions or dissolutions will cast light on the desire amongst opposite-sex 
couples for access to civil partnerships.  
 Thirdly, the use of Oliari as a frame for Arden L.J.’s reasoning adds an interesting 
dimension, particularly as counsel had not cited the case to Andrews J. in the High Court. 
The use of Oliari in Steinfeld perhaps militated towards finding against the Government but it 
must be noted the two cases were factually very different since, in the former, Italy was held 
to be in breach of Article 8 alone for its failure to provide any meaningful form of recognition 
of same-sex relationships (see A. Hayward, “Same-sex Registered Partnerships - A Right to 
be Recognised?” [2016] C.L.J. 27). Nevertheless, by drawing upon the emphasis placed in 
Oliari on the value of State recognition of relationships, choice and the significance of 
“labels”, there is arguably greater potential for the appellants to argue for a breach of Article 
8 alone (see [174] per Briggs L.J.). Whilst combining Article 8 and 14 would perhaps be 
more advantageous in light of the higher standard required to justify discrimination, this use 
of Oliari domestically may signal a broader conceptualisation of family life underpinning 
Article 8. 
 Steinfeld is a bizarre decision. Despite dismissing the couple’s challenge, the Court of 
Appeal unanimously stated that the current position is discriminatory and, with varying 
degrees of patience, all members of the court stated that the status quo cannot be maintained 
indefinitely. On this basis, the litigants succeeded in a de facto manner; indeed, as Arden L.J. 
succinctly states, “the appellants are right” (at [16]-[17]). The Government clearly must make 
the next move. It would, however, be a cruel irony if such a move, precipitated by the 
Steinfeld litigants, involves removing the discrimination by simply abolishing access to civil 
partnerships for all couples.  
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